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Abstract
We present a model with two donors-principals that provide funds to a
unique recipient-agent. Each donor decides how to allocate his aid funds
between a pooled and a donor specific unilateral project. Both principals
and the agent value the output produced with the principals’ pooled and
two unilateral funded projects. However the donors have a bias in favor
of their own unilateral project, which leads them to over-invest in these
projects. The agent establishes a tax on the unilateral projects, which
acts as a protection measure against biased allocation by the principals.
The optimal tax imposed by the recipient on unilateral projects varies
depending on the total amount of aid provided by the donor and on the
productivity of his unilateral project. We present empirical support on
the donors’ preferences for unilateral projects, and how allocations and
fragmentation are affected by recipient’s characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Until recently the literature on aid has focused on recipient countries and macro-
economic issues. After several decades of empirical studies, the effectiveness of
aid in promoting growth is still very much debated.1 One concern with the
macro approach is that it aggregates at the country level the different sources
of aid and treats them as a single pool. Yet in practice aid is fragmented and
this fragmentation, both between donors and channels of delivery, is a major
source of inefficiency. Recent papers have thus started to focus on donors be-
havior and micro-economic issues. This paper contributes to this literature by
studying how the introduction of a tax on unilateral aid might be used to in-
crease aid effectiveness. To be more specific we study in a two-principals-agent
model how a recipient country (the agent) might use taxation to alleviate the
problem of aid fragmentation posed by the donors’ uncoordinated competition
(the principals). By raising the cost of allocating aid to unilateral projects, rel-
ative to pooled aid, the recipient country obliges the donors to internalize the
negative externalities they create on development outcome by their uncoordi-
nated behavior. The paper therefore proposes a new, simple tool to improve aid
effectiveness. If a donor country insists on pushing its own development goals,
it should pay a fee for it. The recipient countries should be allowed to impose a
tax on uncoordinated/unilateral aid flows. The money collected could be used
to improve recipient’s country administrative capacity.
The aid business is a maze. Alongside the official development assistance
(ODA), which includes the bilateral aid traditionally provided by OECD-DAC
countries, but more recently also by emerging countries such as China, Brazil or
the Arab countries,2 and the multilateral aid provided by multilateral organi-
zations such as the World Bank or the Regional Development Banks, there are
thousands of national and international NGOs, foundations and private entities
providing aid. Moreover, not only official development assistance is coming from
different countries and organizations, but even at a country level it is spread
among several agencies. For instance US foreign assistance programs are frag-
mented across more than 50 bureaucracies and USAID is overseeing only 45%
of total US foreign aid (Brainard 2007).3
From the point of view of the recipients, aid fragmentation generates huge
transaction costs. For example, the Tanzanian government has to prepare over
2000 reports to donors and 1000 delegations every year (Easterly and Birdsall
1Many empirical studies suggest that aid has a zero effect on growth or on poverty (Boone
1996; Svensson 1999, 2000; Knack 2001; Brumm 2003; Ovaska 2003; Easterly et al. 2004;
Djankov et al. 2006; Easterly 2006; Powell and Ryan 2006; Williamson 2008). Some papers
argue that good policy in recipient countries increases the effect of aid (see for instance the
papers by Svensson 1999 and Burnside and Dollar 2000), while subsequent studies suggest
that the effect is not robust (see for example, Hansen and Tarp 2000, Easterly et al. 2004 and
Rajan and Subramanian (2007)). Even surveys of the empirical literature find controversial
results (see for instance Doucouliagos and Paldam 2007).
2See Waltz and Ramachandran (2011) for a review of the behaviour of emerging donors.
3Similarly in Germany the ministry for international cooperation coordinates less than 40%
of all German development aid. See http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46043
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2008). The management of donor visits became such a big problem that the
country had to declare a ’mission holiday’ – a four month period to take a
break from visiting delegations (Birdsall 2005). Each of the donors represents
different accountability and procurement rules, and the need to make the project
the donors want to fund match with the existing recipient country’s portfolio.
As a result administrative costs have absorbed 4.7% of gross bilateral ODA in
2005, which is big compared to the 9.6% that went to humanitarian and food
aid or the 2.2% that went to NGO’s (OECD 2008).
The donor community acknowledges the ‘Donor coordination’ problem, but
efforts so far to fix it have been deficient. In fact, since the Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness, fragmentation of aid has increased instead of diminishing.4
For instance, looking at sector aid data for the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) donors, Frot and Santiso (2010) find that, in 2007, more than 90
000 projects were running simultaneously and that developing countries with
the largest numbers of aid projects had more than 2 000 projects in a single
year. With such a proliferation of projects and donors it is hard for recipient
government representatives to coordinate and manage aid flows. Only a part
of the projects are actually known by the different offices, that usually struggle
to obtain information on what is really going on in the area. Confusion on
available resources and procedures to reach them is common.
If there are unrealized benefits from donors coordination why isn’t aid pooled
to enable more development projects to be undertaken? There are various pos-
sible responses to this question, and the answer may be different in different
countries. Some recipient governments may not have the objective of maximiz-
ing social well-being, possibly because of inefficient or corrupt implementation
of projects, and so donors want to control aid to ensure that it is used effi-
ciently. Perhaps the assumption of donors focusing on development outcomes
in recipient country is false in practice. They might have their own agenda such
as promoting their exports or maximizing media coverage in their own country,
in which case they set their own projects and their own administrative rules,
without much consideration for what other donors do. Or perhaps, as the liter-
ature has discussed, donors have different preferences than the recipients about
development outcomes.5 Whatever the reasons, most donors want to control the
way their aid is spent. It is easier to achieve this goal through bilateral aid (i.e.,
government-to-government aid) rather than through multilateral aid (i.e., aid
given by governments through international organisations such as the UN, the
4The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was signed in 2005 by more than 100 countries
to reform the ways in which international aid is delivered and managed. Following the Paris
Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action signatories committed to ’reduce the fragmentation
of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among
donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries,
and across countries’ (source: 2008 report on division of labour: addressing global fragmenta-
tion and concentration). In 2005-06, 38 partner developing countries had more than 25 official
donors, most of them small (OECD 2008). In 24 of these developing countries, 15 or more
donors provided less than 10% of that country’s total aid (OECD 2008).
5Alesina and Dollar(2000) is the seminal paper on donor’s motivations, while Kilby and
Dreher (2010) study how donors motives affect aid effectiveness
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World Bank, the European Commission). As a result bilateral aid constitutes
the vast majority of ODA (e.g., $ 102 billion in 2009), while multilateral aid
constitutes a smaller fraction of ODA (e.g. $ 38 billion in 2009).
We develop a model with one recipient-agent and two donors-principals.
Each of the donors can choose the share of his funds that he wants to pool and
the share that he wants to use in unilateral projects. The production function
of development depends positively on the three inputs (pooled funds and each
unilateral project). They are complement in the sense that the development
good is only produced if a minimum of each of these inputs is provided. However
for donors with biased preferences their unilateral project has more value to
them than to the recipient. In the limit case the unilateral project has no
value for the recipient. To avoid the waste of funds and oblige the donors to
internalize the cost imposed by their biased preferences on the production of
development, the paper explores the possibility for the recipient to impose a tax
on the unilateral projects. So in our setting there are two principals that provide
funds to a unique agent and: (i) both principals and the agent value the output
produced with the principal’s (pooled and unilateral) funded projects and this
output is non-excludable and non-rival, (ii) each principal gets a private benefit
from the funds to the unilateral project, and (iii) the agent can tax the unilateral
projects.
Even if the donors are benevolent, we find that the principals’ budgets play
an important role on the efficiency of aid. Concretely an unbiased donor focuses
on development outcome, while a benevolent recipient maximizes development
outcome minus administrative costs (i.e., is trading-off macro-economic objec-
tives with micro-economic constraints). Because of the administrative costs
involved in aid management there is a maximum volume of aid that the recipi-
ent can handle. Above this threshold the aid is wasted. Moreover, we find that
the way the aid budget is distributed between the donors matters. A necessary
condition for the uncoordinated outcome to be efficient (i.e., to be the outcome
that would be chosen by benevolent, fully coordinated planners) is that the aid
budget of each principal is proportional to the relative productivity of his uni-
lateral project. This first result militates against the micro-aid scheme favored
by some donor countries. For instance among the 3700 aid relationships tracked
down in the OECD Development Co-operation Report (2009), 600 are micro-aid
schemes of under USD 250 000 per year each, and amounting to only 0.1% of
country programmable aid. Such cosmetic aid should be banned as it creates
more problems than it solves.
In addition to the inefficiency generated by an inadequate distribution of
budgets among the donors, there is also the fact that some donors have a private
agenda and want to favor some projects over others for their own benefit. We
show that with biased principals the contributions to unilateral projects are
greater than the welfare maximizing levels, even when the agent values the
projects and there are no moral hazard issues. The distortion increases with the
bias. There is a limit however: the investment made in the unilateral project is
constrained by donor’s budget (i.e., he cannot spend on unilateral project more
than his total budget).
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The paper explores next the possibility for the recipient to impose a tax on
the unilateral projects to limit the consequences of the uncoordinated behavior
by multiple donors. In order to optimize the allocation of funds across the
different projects the agent might charge each principal a payment proportional
to the amount he wants to invest in his own project. The fee/cost imposed
by the recipient for unilateral projects acts as a protection measure. Even if it
is a pure waste of resources, it decreases unilateral allocations bringing them
closer to the first best level. By taxing the unilateral funds the recipient can
thus correct for the principals’ biais, and hence the loss of resources due to the
transfers requested by the agent is compensated by an allocation of funds which
is closer to the coordinated level.
From a policy perspective this mechanism is appealing as it is simple and
might help to finance the administrative costs imposed by the management
of fragmented aid on the recipient country. The paper studies the optimal
taxation scheme from the recipient point of view. The paper shows that the
optimal tax rates should be different for different donors. This is a concern for
the implementation of such a corrective taxation scheme. Assuming the donor’s
community agrees on the utility to tax unilateral aid to reduce fragmentation
and to strengthen recipients countries administrative capacity, it is unlikely that
the donors will agree on different tax rates for different donors.
From an empirical point of view we want to check the existence of donors’
biases in aid allocation as these biases are the rationale to implement a taxation
scheme on unilateral aid. We are also interested on how the individual behavior
of donors depends on the amount and composition of the aid received by the
recipient and the behavior of other donors at same recipient. Indeed the model
predicts that each donor unilateral contribution is increasing in his private ben-
efits from the unilateral project (i.e., donor’s bias) and is also increasing in own
and other donor’s budget. Unfortunately the available data on aid channel de-
livery is not great. There is only a 2 years window where the data recording
is detailed enough so that we can identify with some confidence unilateral and
multilateral aid. Exploiting this 2 years panel the results are consistent with
the model prediction. In particular using a methodology proposed by Knack
(2013) to assess the extent of donor bias the regressions suggest that donors
with a stronger bias allocate more funds trough the unilateral channel. Since
the quality of the available data allows only for correlation analysis, we interpret
these preliminary results as an encouragement to further explore the possibility
to impose administrative fees on donors that insist in pushing their own aid
projects with their own accounting rules.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies the benchmark situation
of coordinated principals: principals’ funds are pooled and a benevolent planner
allocates them to different projects to maximize development returns. Section
5 presents the uncoordinated principal’s setting and derives the optimal taxes
that the agent should impose for the implementation of the principals’ unilat-
eral project. Section 6 presents empirical evidence to assess the relevance of
principal biased preferences. Finally section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
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2 Relationship with the Literature
The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) highlights the need to har-
monize the operational policies, procedures, and practices of donor institutions
with those of partner country systems to improve the effectiveness of devel-
opment assistance.6 Transaction costs and problems on the coordination of
projects controlled by a pool of donors have been the main concerns in the aid
coordination literature, as summarized in Bigsten (2006).
The literature on the adverse effects of donors fragmentation on aid effec-
tiveness is extensive and has looked at the problem from different angles. Knack
and Rahman (2007) study the impact of donor fragmentation on bureaucratic
quality of aid recipients given the competition for skilled labor. Knack and Rah-
man (2008) summarize the problems of donors fragmentation highlighting the
problem of responsibility diffused between donors and the possible dis-alignment
of incentives among them. They emphasize the need for recipients to be able
to select a leader donor, and cite examples on recipients declining stand-alone
projects. Knack and Smets (2012) analyze the relationship between fragmenta-
tion and tying from the donor’s side. They show that untying aid and reducing
fragmentation turn out to be complementary interests for the donors. Easterly
and Pfutze (2008) analyze donor’s distribution of funds among the many re-
cipients and how it relates to good aid practices. Djankov et al. (2009) study
the impact of aid fragmentation on efficiency and corruption. Dreher and Kilby
(2009) show that donors motives matter on aid effectiveness, and hence that
private benefits from unilateral projects should be taken into account. Bobba
and Powell (2006) open the black box of the cause of aid fragmentation, and
show that donors face a trade-off between coordination costs and dilution of
individual objectives when choosing between bilateral and multilateral contri-
butions. Achaya et al (2006) analyze donor proliferation. Easterly and Pfutze
(2008) and Easterly and Williamson (2010) analyze the best and worse prac-
tices of aid agencies and the remedies donors should implement to alleviate the
problem.
The literature tends to look at the problems (causes and consequences) of
aid fragmentation from the donors community perspective. The novelty of our
approach is to look at the fragmentation problem from the recipient’s point of
view, and not from the donors point of view.7 Our paper is therefore comple-
mentary to the aforementioned literature as we explore the actions the recipient
might take to discipline the donors and alleviate the problem posed by aid frag-
mentation. In our setting the recipient draws taxes (or administrative fees) for
6See for example Balogun (2005) for the distinction between harmonization of procedures,
alignment of objective and ownership. Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore (2004) present a
good description of the different measures of donor proliferation.
7There is a vast literature on aid contracting, including among others Azam and Laffont
(2003), Svenson (2003), Morrissey, Clist and Issopi (2012), that works on conditionality. This
literature also looks at the problem of aid effectiveness from the donors perspective: The
problem is the recipient behavior and aid conditionality is a tool to influence the recipient’s
use of the aid. Our approach, on the other hand, centers on the donor’s biased decision and
how it can be corrected by the recipient’s taxation policy.
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the implementation of unilateral projects as protection measures to inefficient
donors’ allocations. He does not reject unilateral projects if they are useless, he
taxes them to reorient the aid flow where it is most needed. The tax instrument
therefore fills a double purpose. First it helps the recipient country to collect
funds to strengthen its administrative capacity to overcome the problems illu-
minated by Roodman (2006 [a, b]) and Knack and Rahman (2007). Second it
helps to align the interests of the donors with the interest of the recipient, which
is a major challenge as shown, for instance, by Bobba and Powell (2006), Knack
and Rahman (2008), and Dreher and Kilby(2009). It is a stick used to keep the
donors in line and to modulate their aid flows. In that sense, our paper looks
at the reverse problem of the investment coordination model presented in Bond
and Pande (2007), where taxes were used as an incentive device in a multi-agent
moral hazard model.
In our model we prove the existence of an upper bound on the donors’ ag-
gregate budget above which the recipient stops using the aid money. This upper
bound, above which the utility of the recipient is decreasing, comes from the
agent’s management costs and the decreasing returns to scale of the develop-
ment production function. Waste of resources in our case comes both from
agent’s and principals’ choices, in contraposition to the usual approach of only
considering administrative burdens on agents, as in Roodman (2006 [a, b]). We
coincide with Roodman (2006 [a, b]) in highlighting that increasing aid budget
does not necessarily lead to higher development production, since we coincide
with them in giving an upper bound on the budget that can be ’managed’ by
each recipient: in their paper this bound is given by the administrative capacity,
while in ours it is determined both by the productivity of each of the projects,
and the recipients’s management costs.
We also find that the allocation of funds among projects in one sector can
be unbalanced (either due to unbalanced aid budget between the donors or
due to bias in donors’ preferences). This result is a complement to Halonen-
Akatwijuka (2007) who study the allocation of funds among sectors to avoid
donor concentration in some sectors and underfunding of others. We look at
the allocation of funds inside one sector, and there is no crowding-out of agent’s
choices due to aid, as in Torsvik (2005). Nevertheless we show that under/over
funding of some projects inside a sector is a problem too.
Finally from the empirical point of view, we are interested on how the indi-
vidual behavior of donors depends on their bias, the amount and composition
of the aid received by the recipient and the behavior of other donors at same
recipient. We draw heavily on the evidences provided by Knack (2013), which
is discussed in section 6.
3 The model
In our setting we have two principals (the donors), denoted by k = 1, 2, that
provide funds to a unique agent (the recipient), denoted r. We consider two
possible channels for the funds delivery:
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• Unilateral aid projects, referred to as a = 1, 2, implemented by the recip-
ient government according to the principal’s k = 1, 2 established procure-
ment rules
• Pooling of funds, referred to as a = p, where both principals join efforts
for the design and implementation of the project and jointly bargain with
the agent.
Let Bk be the principal k total aid budget, and let pk and uk be the amount
contributions to the pool and to the unilateral project respectively. For the
proposal of an unilateral project, the principal needs to pay a percentage ck of
the value of the unilateral contribution to the recipient. That is, ck is the cost
of the agent’s pre-requisites for unilateral projects. It can be interpreted as a
tax to cover the expenses of meetings with the recipient and bargaining. It is a
tool to regulate the flow of aid that goes into unilateral aid. Hence, the budget
constraint for principal k = 1, 2 is given by:
Bk = pk + (1 + ck)uk (1)
Funds are transferred by each principal to the agent. The total development
outcome depends on the volume of aid which is allocated to each project. To
keep the analysis simple we focus on a development production function of the
Cobb-Douglas form with coefficients αa ≥ 0 (a = 1, 2, p):
G(u1, u2, p) = uα11 u
α2
2 p
αp (2)
where p = p1+p2 denotes the total amount of funds in the pool. We rule out the
optimization problem linked to non-convexity by assuming decreasing returns
to scale.
α1 + α2 + αp ≤ 1 (3)
The Cobb-Douglas function implies that independent projects cannot be
successful in absence of the pooled activity, and that the pooled project cannot
be successful without the support of the unilateral activities.8 For example, if
pooled funds go to recurrent expenditures for hospitals and dispensaries, one
of the donors has a unilateral program to fund medical supplies and pharma-
ceutical and the other funds a tutoring program for nurses and doctors, the
independent projects cannot be successful if the hospitals and dispensaries are
not open and running (i.e. if the pooled project is not successful), and the
reverse argument also holds. Similarly in a situation where pooled funds go
to recurrent education expenditures, one of the donors funds a unilateral nu-
trition program and the other donor funds a tutoring program, the unilateral
projects cannot be successful if the school is not open and running. The output
8In this case, the public good is necessary for each donor for his unilateral project to
work. The situation is reverse of the incentives on CSR approaches to public goods as Besley
and Ghatak (2007). The concern now is more on the public versus private benefit from the
contributions, as in Besley and Ghatak (2006).
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education is only attained when the three projects work simultaneously. Each
donor gets benefit from the development good produced plus additional rents
from the unilateral project contributions. Hence, the contribution to the pool
is a public good. Each donor has an incentive to wait for the other donor to
contribute to get better returns on its own unilateral project. Yet someone has
to put something in the pool to get results from the unilateral projects.
Finally in some cases the unilateral project of one principal might have no
impact on development. Such useless projects are referred by the international
community discussing aid as ’SWEDOW’ (for ’stuff-we-don’t-want’).9 In this
case the coefficient αa corresponding to this unilateral project will be equal to
0.
Let B = B1 + B2. Since by virtue of (1) p = B − (1 + c1)u1 − (1 + c2)u2
and since αp ≤ 1 the production function G(.) in (2) is increasing and concave
in B = B1 + B2. That is, the greater the budgets the better, with decreasing
returns.
3.1 Principal’s utility
Principals care about the development outcome produced through their funds
allocation but they also may derive utility from the visibility of their unilateral
project and from the establishment of procurement rules that directly or indi-
rectly benefit their own commercial and political interests. Principal’s k = 1, 2
utility has the form:
Uk(uk) = G(u1, u2, p) + ζkH(uk) (4)
Term ζk ≥ 0 is the bias in principal k preference for his own unilateral
project. The weight ζk decreases with altruism. It would be zero for a perfectly
altruistic principal, or unbounded for a perfectly egoistic principal for whom
development returns represent a negligible part of the utility.10 Term H(uk) is
a strictly increasing and concave function of the unilateral contribution uk:
H ′(uk) > 0 and H ′′(uk) ≤ 0 (5)
Each principal maximizes (4) by choosing the allocation
uk ∈ [0, Bk1 + ck ]
compatible with his budget constraint (1) and subject to the agent’s individual
rationality constraint that is derived below.
9To illustrate what a SWEDON is see for instance the post Tom Murphy wrote at
http://www.humanosphere.org/basics/2013/07/romney-ryan-campaign-lives-on-in-kenya/
10As Powell and Bobba (2006) show, donors face a trade-off between coordination costs
and dilution of individual objectives when choosing between bilateral and multilateral con-
tributions. We look at this problem from a single recipient problem: proceed with unilateral
projects with private benefits or contribute to the pool where each donor preferences are
diluted. Milner and Tingley (2011) discuss the choice of multilateralism from a US foreign
policy prospective.
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3.2 Agent’s utility
The recipient chooses the level of the fee ck ≥ 0 (k = 1, 2) to be paid by each of
the principals for the establishment of unilateral projects in the country. This
fee can be a real tax that helps financing public expenses. It might also represent
the value of the perks when the agent used part of the received funds for private
use (e.g. such as fancy SUV cars, trips, and restaurants). As Williamson and
Agha (2008) point out, funding activities parallel to the pooled funds generate
multiple material and non-material benefits for the ministers and civil servants
of the sectors involved. The important point is that it is lost to the principal k
and to the development project.11 For the agent, this fee represents a reduction
of the funds to be managed and hence a reduction in the cost of investment. As
discussed in the aid literature, developing countries have limited administrative
capacity (see for instance Knack and Rahman (2008), McGillvray and Morrissey
(2001), Lloyd, Morrissey, and Ossei (2005)). Managing many unilateral projects
is very costly for them. In this context, the fees represent for the agent a relative
utility gain when he does not have to manage all the unilateral aid funds, but
only a fraction of them.
The agent’s cost of investing the received funds depends on the amount
of funds to be managed. We assume that the cost of managing funds Ψ(.)
is increasing and convex in the flows received.12 By virtue of (1) p1 + p2 =
B − (1 + c1)u1 − (1 + c2)u2. Agent’s investment cost is given by the increasing
and convex function:
Ψ(p1 + p2 + u1 + u2) = Ψ
(
B − u1c1 − u2c2
)
Similarly G(u1, u2, p) = G(B, u1, u2 | c1, c2). The agent’s objective is to choose
(c1, c2), the fees level for handling unilateral funds, to maximize his utility given
the principals’ funds allocation. The agent’s utility in case he chooses to invest
the aid funds in the projects is given by
Ur(c1, c2) = G(B, u1 , u2 | c1, c2)−Ψ(B − u1c1 − u2c2)
In case the agent chooses not to invest in any of the projects, his utility is 0.
To avoid the funds wasting the agent individual rationality constraint is
G(B, u1 , u2 | c1, c2)−Ψ
(
B − u1c1 − u2c2
)
> 0 (6)
The agent receives benefits from the output produced with the transferred
funds that cannot be appropriated by the principal. In comparison with the
standard moral hazard models, the principal has one instrument less since he
cannot choose the share of the ’public good’ produced that can be appropriated
11We could add to the analysis a function Γ(c1u1 + c2u2), increasing and concave, that
would be the utility received by the agent from the fees requested to the principals for the
unilateral projects. This would not change our results.
12We abstract here of interactions among the different projects on effort costs. For example,
Knack and Rahman (2007) study how recipient’s bureaucratic quality is affected by donor’s
preferences and number of projects.
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by the agent: here the production of development is enjoyed in a non-excludable
way by both principals and by the agent. This is in contrast to what usually
occurs in piece rates or sharecropping agreements. Hence, it is likely that when
the development outcome is high so that investment gives large returns to the
agent, the participation constraint does not bind.
Timing is as follows:
1. The agent announces c1 ≥ 0 and c2 ≥ 0, the cost to be paid by the
principals for the management of their unilateral projects.
2. Each donor chooses simultaneously the share of his budget to be allocated
to the pool and the share allocated to the unilateral project.
3. The recipient takes the decision of whether or not to invest the fund in
the development project.
In our model, both the agent-recipient and the principals-donors take deci-
sions, namely the costs for unilateral projects and the allocation of funds, that
affect the development returns from a given budget. In our case, agent’s con-
tribution to the production is his choice of using the aid money in a productive
way, and is a necessary ingredient for aid effectiveness, so in contrast to Torsvik
(2005) there is no crowding-out of agent’s choices due to aid. Moreover, waste
of aid resources in the form of a tax comes from agent’s choices and is imposed
on the principals, in contraposition to the usual approach of only considering
administrative burdens on agents, as in Roodman (2006 [a, b]). It is a tool to
better align donors and recipient interests. Since the objective functions of the
recipient and of the donors are not aligned, and since all of them make decisions
that influence the development outcome, the solution to the aid allocation game
is quite complex. We first solve the benchmark case where principals coordinate
their allocation of funds.
4 Benevolent planner’s problem
In this section we derive the first best solution from a centralized and benevolent
principal point of view. We assume the principals pool all their resources and
then choose the allocation to each type of project so as to maximize aggregate
development returns G. In this case the budget constraint when both principals
funds are merged is
B = B1 +B2 = (1 + c1)u1 + (1 + c2)u2 + p (7)
where p represents funds that go to the pool and u1 and u2 the funds that go
to the projects implemented unilaterally by principal 1 and 2 respectively. The
principals transfer aid money if the development project is worthwhile for the
agent. No funds are transferred otherwise.
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On a totally coordinated setting with monitored investment, the planner
maximizes development returns. The benevolent planner solves
max
u1,u2
G(B, u1, u2 | c1, c2) = uα11 uα22
(
B − (1 + c1)u1 − (1 + c2)u2
)αp
under the aggregated budget constraint (7). Since α = α1 + α2 + αp ≤ 1, the
optimal allocation of funds is given by
u∗1 =
α1
α
B
1 + c1
(8)
u∗2 =
α2
α
B
1 + c2
(9)
p∗ =
αp
α
B (10)
Development outcome is given by
G∗(B, c1, c2) =
(
α1
1 + c1
)α1 ( α2
1 + c2
)α2
ααpp
(
B
α
)α
(11)
that is concave in the budget B given the non increasing return to scale assump-
tion α1 + α2 + αp ≤ 1. Let
Ω =
αα11 α
α2
2 α
αp
p
αα
(12)
The agent’s utility when he takes into account the planner’s optimal alloca-
tion is given by:
Ur(B, c1, c2) = G∗(B, c1, c2)−Ψ
(
B− c11+c1 α1α B − c21+c2 α2α B
)
(13)
To make the analysis interesting we focus on cases where the agent is willing to
take the aid fund and uses it in a productive way rather than to simply turn
it down or destroy it. This requires that condition (6) holds for some value of
the parameters, and thus that the function Ψ(B) is relatively small compared
to G∗(B, 0, 0), at least for some value of B. We hence assume in the sequel of
the paper that Ψ(0) = Ψ′(0) = 0 so that there exists a strictly positive value of
B, denoted B, such that
ΩBα = Ψ(B). (14)
Under our assumptions (α ≤ 1 and Ψ(x) strictly increasing and convex), the
function ΩBα−Ψ(B) is strictly concave. Moreover, since Ψ′(0) = 0, it is strictly
increasing when B → 0+ so that B > 0 exists. We also deduce that there exists
a value of B, lower than B so that ΩBα − Ψ(B) is maximal. Let Ba∗ > 0 be
the optimal coordinated budget from the agent’s point of view (i.e., taking into
account the cost of managing them). It is such that13
αBα−1Ω = Ψ′(B). (15)
13Since Ψ′(B) increases with B and since αBα−1Ω is not increasing with B (i.e., it decreases
if α < 1 and is constant if α = 1), these two functions cross at most once. It is easy to check
that under the assumption Ψ′(0) = 0 B > 0 hence exists and is unique.
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We have 0 < Ba∗ < B. For the sake of interpretation it is convenient to assume
that Ψ(B) is initially sufficiently small so that B >> 0 (i.e., B is large).14 The
agent has no incentive to waste the money at the optimum whenever B ≤ B
(i.e., agent’s individual rationality constraint holds). If the principals choose to
give much more than B the extra aid money is wasted as the agent is not willing
(unable) to handle it. Let B be defined by equation (14). The next assumption
helps us to rule out corner solutions.
A1 B ≤ B
Given the planner’s allocation of funds, the agent chooses whether to ask
for special fees for unilateral projects, i.e. he optimizes on the choice of c1 and
c2. The optimal agent’s decision depends on the trade-off between the benefits
of these fees (i.e., decrease in investment/management costs) and the loss of
development outcome.
The agent’s utility (13) is not necessarily concave in (c1, c2). Indeed the
function G∗(B, c1, c2), which is decreasing in c1 and in c2, is convex in (c1, c2),
while the function −Ψ(B − c11+c1 α1α B − c21+c2 α2α B) is increasing and concave in
(c1, c2). This implies that we do not necessarily get an interior solution.
Proposition 1 (Agent’s requests with coordinated principals) Under as-
sumption A1 the agent sets a uniform c1 = c2 = c∗ > 0 solution to
Ψ′
(
B
α+ αpc
α(1 + c)
)
= αBα−1Ω(1 + c)1−α1−α2 (16)
if and only if B ∈ [Ba∗, B] where Ba∗ is defined equation (15) and B equation
(14). He sets c1 = c2 = c∗ = 0 otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix 8.1.
14For instance if α = 1 and Ψ(B) = B
2
2ψ
, ψ is a large number so that B = 2Ωψ is large too.
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Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates the result of Proposition 1. The agent would be willing
to choose different c′s for the two unilateral projects according to their relative
productivity, but that is already accounted for by the coordinated principal’s
allocation so that at the optimum they are equal. When the total budget of
the principals is lower than Ba∗ the cost of managing the fund is sufficiently
low so that the agent does not want to charge positive fees. The agent puts
a distortion on the allocation to unilateral projects when the marginal benefit
from increasing c over zero in terms of investment cost reduction is greater
than the marginal loss in terms of development outcome, which occurs when
Ψ′(B) > αBα−1Ω. For instance with α = 1 (i.e., constant returns to scale)
the condition is simply Ψ′(B) > Ω. The condition holds more easily when the
global budget B is large and/or when the unilateral projects have a relative
low effect on the development production function (i.e., when either α1 or α2
are small so that Ω = αα11 α
α2
2 (1 − α1 − α2)1−α1−α2 is small). This first result
illustrates that, even if the principals are fully coordinated and altruistic, there
is a benefit for the recipient to charge strictly positive fees. The principals
focus on development outcome and they neglect the administrative burden the
management of these funds impose on the recipient. The later imposes a tax on
the unilateral funds to oblige the principals to internalize this cost.
From a policy perspective Proposition 1 implies that, everything else being
equal recipients getting more aid (i.e., larger B) should request strictly positive
fees c∗ > 0, even in the fully coordinated case. Moreover totally differentiating
(16) one can check that the fee c∗ is increasing with B. In other words, Propo-
sition 1 implies that the fee requested by the recipient should be increasing with
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the amount of aid received.
5 Independent principal’s choice
We are now turning to the more realistic case of independent principals. Our
goal is to compare the independent principals’ choice with the first best outcome
derived in the previous section where all funds were pooled and allocated to
the three projects by an output-maximizing planner. In doing so, we want to
study how principals’ and agent’s choices affect development outcomes. On
the one hand, we look at the loss in output due to the distribution of budgets
among the donors and their biased preferences towards unilateral projects. On
the other hand, we want to check in which situations the taxes on unilateral
projects imposed by the agent are output increasing and hence their ’waste’ is
compensated by a better choice of channel of delivery by the principals.
When choosing the channel of delivery for aid funds, the principal’s problem
differs from the benevolent planner’s in several aspects:
1. Each principal is constrained by his own budget to allocate to the unilat-
eral and pooled project, while the benevolent planner may use the sum of
funds to allocate to the three alternatives.
2. Principal’s preferences may differ from the benevolent planner’s prefer-
ences: The principals may have biased preferences as they obtain special
benefit from their own unilateral projects.
3. The pooled funding is a public good for both principals, which increases
the productivity of the unilateral projects. Hence, there may be a prob-
lem of free riding when each principal optimizes his objective function
independently.
We present a special case of common agency: we have two principals that use
a common agent to achieve a development goal. In our case, common agency
is not a problem of which actions to incentive, as in Berheim and Whinston
(1986),15 but a problem of how funds are allocated by each principal to maxi-
mize his investment returns and how these decisions affect the agent’s incentive
to charge positive fees on the unilateral projects. Given the complementarity
among the different projects, the principals agree on that the agent should use
the funds to finance all projects. They might however disagree on the amounts
that should be invested in each of them.
15The literature on common agency is extensive, especially on common agency with adverse
selection. For instance Khalil, Martimort and Parigi (2007) study monitoring coordination,
Martimort and Stole (2009) study principal’s coalitions, and Alonso, Dessein and Matouscheck
(2008) study when coordination requires centralization.
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5.1 Principals’ allocation problem
We start the analysis with the case of altruistic principals: ζ1 = ζ2 = 0. The
principals’ objective functions are identical but the budget constraints are dif-
ferent because in general B1 6= B2:
max
uk
G(Bk +Bj , uk, uj | ck, cj)
s.t.budget constraint
Bk = pk + (1 + ck)uk (1)
agent’s IR
G(Bk +Bj , uk, uj | ck, cj)−Ψ
(
B − ukck − ujcj
)
> 0 (6)
We next show that even if the principals have exactly the same objective function
an uneven distribution of aid budget can generate inefficiency.
Proposition 2 (Uncoordinated allocation with altruistic principals)Let
assumption A1 hold. When principals are altruistic the allocation of resources
coincides with the coordinated optimal choice if and only if
α1
α2 + αp
6 B1
B2
6 α1 + αp
α2
(17)
Proof. See the appendix 8.2.
Condition (17) is intuitive: to reach the first best allocation in the uncoor-
dinated case it is necessary that the funds are distributed among donors pro-
portionally to the productivity of their different projects. Hence, inefficiencies
might arise not because of divergence in preferences between principals but sim-
ply because of an unbalanced distribution of funds with respect to the relative
productivity of the unilateral projects.
We now turn to the case where the principals have biased preferences, due
for example to good publicity of the initiative, or to the extra benefit a principal
gets from using his own procurement rules. The parameter ζk > 0 determines
the value for principal k of his own unilateral project. Principal’s k problem is
max
uk
G(Bk +Bj , uk, uj | ck, cj) + ζkH(uk) (18)
s.t. budget constraint (1)
agent’s IR (6)
Proposition 3 (Unilateral allocations as strategic substitutes) When the
principals have biased preferences towards unilateral projects, principal’s contri-
butions to their unilateral projects, first, are strategic substitutes and, second,
are increasing with the principals’ bias.
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Proof. See the appendix 8.3.
Contribution to the pool is a public good, and given that unilateral projects
provide private benefits, it is in the interest of a principal to decrease its pool
contribution when the amount contributed by the other principal increases.
Since everything else being equal contribution to the pool increases with a donor
budget, we deduce from Proposition 3 that donors with large aid budget con-
tribute more to the pool than donors with small budget. Distortion with respect
to the coordinated allocation is greater the greater is the principal’s benefit from
unilateral projects (i.e., the larger ζk ≥ 0). Indeed if the principal has a bias
for his unilateral project, he will put more ressources into it and less into the
common pool: everything else being equal, a biased principal will contribute
less often to the pooled than an altruistic one.
We deduce from this analysis two testable implications. First, the principal’s
allocation of funds towards unilateral projects is increasing with the principals’
bias (i.e., uk is increasing in ζk). Second, everything else being equal, large
donors contribute more to the pool than small one (i.e., uk is increasing in Bk).
5.2 Agent’s reaction: choice of (c1, c2)
Proposition 1 establishes that the fees are symmetric when both principals are
altruistic. An important issue from a policy perspective is whether this result
still holds when the principals have biased preferences. It is indeed important to
check whether the recipient should be allowed to apply different administrative
fees to different donors or not. The agent needs to decide whether to ask for
special fees for the unilateral projects to one, both or neither of the principals.
To do so, the agent takes into account the type of the pair of principals he is
facing. When he faces two altruistic principals, the agent’s problem is the same
as in the benevolent planner’s case of section 4 as long as the distribution of
budgets is such that first best allocation is attainable. In order to study the
impact of bias in principals preference, we assume in this section that condition
(17) holds. If distortion in the choice of (c1, c2) occurs compared to the solution
of Proposition 1 it is because the principals have biased preferences. Moreover
we also assume that the bias in principals’ utility function is linear in the amount
invested in the unilateral project: H(u) = u. The linearity assumption simplifies
the exposition. By continuity our result holds for a strictly concave function.
Proposition 4 (Asymmetric fees with symmetric biais) Assume that con-
dition (17) holds, that H(u) = u, and that the principals have symmetrically
biased preferences towards their unilateral projects, ζ1 = ζ2 = ζ. Then c1 = c2
if and only if α1 = α2.
Proof. See the appendix 8.4.
Proposition 4 shows that the optimal fees are not symmetric with biased
principals. Although the two principals have symmetrical preferences the fact
that they are biased towards their unilateral project generally kills the symmetry
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of the recipient solution in fees because the unilateral projects are not equally
beneficial in terms of the development outcome.
To illustrate this result we present here the extreme case where the unilateral
project provided by one of the principals, principal 2 without loss of generality,
has no effect on development outcome (i.e., it is a SWEDOW): α2 = 0. The
development production function is G(u1, p) = uα11 p
αp with α1 + αp ≤ 1. Even
if ζ1 = ζ2 = ζ > 0, it is intuitive that the agent will choose a fee for project 2
that is higher than for project 1, simply to discourage the waste of investing in
project 2. The agent sets a fee for principal 2 as big as necessary to ensure that
his contribution to the unilateral project is zero.16
From the principal 1 point of view, there is then in the pool an amount B2 of
funds as budget support, which allocation is exogenous of any strategic interest.
This situation is equivalent to the case where there is only one principal and
one agent. The principal 1 optimization problem is the following:
max
u1
uα11 p
αp + ζH(u1) (19)
s.t. p = B2 +B1 − (1 + c1)u1 (20)
u1 6
B1
1 + c1
(21)
where (20) is the principal’s budget constraint, and (21) sets the constraint on
the maximum unilateral allocation feasible for the principal. Let’s substitute
(20) into the principal objective function:
max
u1
uα11 (B2 +B1 − (1 + c1)u1)αp + ζH(u1) (22)
Neglecting (21) we define uˆ1 as the unconstrained solution to (22). Deriving
(22) we obtain that uˆ1 is solution to:
α1u
α1−1
1 p
αp − (1 + c1)αpuα11 pαp−1 + ζH ′(u1) = 0 (23)
Let uˆ1 be defined in equation (23). The principal investment in the unilateral
project is
u∗1 = min
{
uˆ1,
B1
1 + c1
}
. (24)
Replacing p = B2 + B1 − (1 + c1)u1 by its value and totally differentiating
(23), under the assumption H ′′(u) ≤ 0, it is straightforward to check that uˆ1
increases with ζ, and with B2. The principal contribution to the pool decreases
with ζ (i.e., uˆ1 increases with ζ). This result is a reminiscence of the result in
Proposition 3 (i.e., when the strategic interactions between the two principals
are taken into account). Moreover uˆ1 increases with B2 which means that his
contribution to the pool decreases with the exogenous amount of funds available
in the pool. In fact the principal contributes to the pool only when the resources
that are already in the pool are relatively small in comparison to his budget.
16To get u∗2 = 0 requires c2 to be so that
∂U2(u1,u2)
∂u2
= −(1+c2)αpuα11 pαp−1+ζH′(u2) < 0.
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This result is robust if the principal is unbiased.17 We deduce from this analysis
one testable implication. A principal contributes more to the pool when the
resources already there (i.e., from multilateral aid and from others exogenous
sources) are small.
We have shown in Proposition 4 that unless everything is symmetrical (i.e.,
the bias and the productivity of the unilateral project) the optimal solution is
asymmetric. This result is reinforced when the bias are different. This is a case
where the optimal fees statistically are never equal. We deduce the following
result.
Corollary 5 If at least one of the principal has biased preferences then in gen-
eral c∗1 6= c∗2.
We elaborate on the previous example to illustrate Corollary 5. We assume
that α2 = 0 and we add that ζ1 6= ζ2 > 0.5. To derive a closed-form solution we
further assume that α1 = αp = 0.5, H(u) = u, and B1 = B2 = B/2 < Ba∗/2
with Ba∗ = Ψ′−1(0.5) being computed from (15). That is, at the first best
solution the optimal investment levels are u∗1 = B/2, u
∗
2 = 0 and p
∗ = B/2,
which yields a utility for the recipient: Ur(u∗1, u
∗
2, p
∗) = B2 − Ψ (B). We next
show that the agent can by differentiating c1 and c2, decentralize this first best
solution.
The agent needs first to set a fee for principal 2 as big as necessary to ensure
that his contribution to the unilateral project is zero. We are thus left with a
corner solution where u∗2 = 0 which requires c2 to be such that
∂U2(u1, u2)
∂u2
= −1 + c2
2
√
u1
p
+ ζ2 < 0 (25)
The best response functions of principal 1 is
∂U1(u1, u2)
∂u1
=
1
2
√
p
u1
− 1 + c1
2
√
u1
p
+ ζ1 = 0 (26)
Substituting u∗2 = 0 in (26) we deduce that
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u∗∗1 =
B
2
(
1 + c1 + ζ21 − ζ1
√
1 + c1 + ζ21
) > B
2(1 + c1)
(27)
but u∗∗1 is not feasible: principal 1 would be willing to spend more than his funds
in his unilateral project since he obtains private benefits from it and principal
17When ζ = 0, (23) yields uˆ1 =
α1
α1+αp
B2+B1
1+c1
so that uˆ1 increases with B2, while for (21)
to be satisfied it requires that B1 > α1αpB2.
18We set x =
√
p
u1
and solve the second order equation (26): x2 + 2ζ1x − (1 + c1) = 0.
Taking the square of the only positive root, yields p
u1
=
(√
1 + c1 + ζ21 − ζ1
)2
. Substituting
p = B − (1 + c1)u1 in this equation and solving it yields u∗∗1 in (27).
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2 is already allocating all his budget to the pool. Hence, he is constrained by
his ressources so that
u∗1 =
B
2(1 + c1)
, u∗2 = 0
will be the equilibrium as long as
c2 > 2ζ2
√
1 + c1 − 1
The optimal solution is then c∗1 = 0 and c
∗
2 ≥ 2ζ2 − 1 > 0.
By differentiating c2 from c1 the recipient is able to decentralize the first best
outcome. This result is not robust when both unilateral projects are needed
for the production of development. In this case there is no taxes structure
that permits to decentralize the first best outcome, because to discourage the
principals to over-invest in their unilateral projects the recipient has to tax the
aid money invested unilaterally. This is a waste of ressources compared to the
first best outcome and the development level is lower. Nevertheless the creation
of taxes on unilateral projects helps to bring the equilibrium closer to the first
best. It improves the development outcome compared to a situation purely
managed by donors.
In this section we have shown that the recipient is able to improve the
decentralized equilibrium by taxing unilateral projects. The correction that
the agent needs to implement to move the equilibrium closer to his preferred
solution depends on the size of the principals’ bias and on the productivity of the
unilateral investments on the development outcome. Even when the principals
have symmetrical preferences the optimal fees are generally different. This is
a concern from a policy perspective as donors are unlikely to accept to pay
different fees for the management of their unilateral aid projects. One solution
could be for the recipient countries to prepare a list of development projects
that are prioritized by their government. For the unilateral projects falling in
this needed category the fee could be lower than for unilateral projects not
prioritized by the government. Similarly the fee could be decreasing with the
amount of funds transferred. Very small aid volumes should be taxed more
heavily so as to discouraged aid fragmentation and the associated problem of
aid unbalance analyzed in the paper. Taking action against poverty through
micro aid projects can make it appear as if something has been done to address
the issue of economic development, while in reality it would be more efficient to
address the problem by pooling funds. And clearly, it does not make much sense
to introduce an inconsistent or dysfunctional aid strategy unless it is merely a
window-dressing initiative intended to impress voters. If the donor community
is sincere in its willingness to fight fragmentation and improve aid efficiency it
should explore the possibility for recipient countries to tax uncoordinated aid.
The tariffs should not be linear in the volume of aid transferred. It should also
vary with the importance of the projects funded.
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6 Empirical Evidences: Donors’ choice of Aid
channel of delivery
Donor fragmentation is at the center of the Aid Effectiveness Debate: the exis-
tence of multiple (uncoordinated) donors and their choices of channel of deliv-
ery of their funds are important determinants of aid effectiveness. As has been
pointed out both by academics and by practitioners, data for the study of donor
fragmentation and choice of channel of delivery is very limited. Calls for more
transparency on aid activities, specially on the channels of delivery used, are
an old request from both communities. The 2008 OECD survey on monitoring
the Paris Declaration was the first big attempt to measure donor coordination
problems from the recipient’s perspective. We present in Table 1 a summary of
the data published in this survey. This information is only available for a small
cross-section of countries in 2007 selected by the publication,19 but it is worth
looking at it due to its detail: we observe that only 21.5% of donor missions are
coordinated, and only 37% of aid uses country systems, hinting an important
lack of joint efforts both at the planning and implementation of development
projects.
In the theoretical part of this paper we analyzed how donors’ budgets, pref-
erences towards unilateral projects, the recipient’s taxation for their implemen-
tation and the behavior of other donors to the same recipient affect the donors’
choice of channel of aid delivery. In practice recipients of aid have not yet ex-
perimented with the tax instrument to reduce aid fragmentation.20 We lack
therefore data on how such a tax might curb fragmentation and improve aid
efficiency. By contrast we have some information on the channel of aid delivery
decomposed by donor and by recipient. We focus on this information to asses
the relevance of the model main assumptions, and therefore the relevance of
experimenting with a taxation scheme to reduce fragmentation. There are two
main testable implications from our model. First, the model predicts that the
principal’s allocation of funds towards unilateral projects will be increasing with
the principal’s bias towards his own projects. And second, the principal’s allo-
cation of funds towards unilateral projects will be increasing with other sources
of funds, for example multilateral transfers, that the recipient is perceiving (i.e.,
for a donor with biased preferences investment in the pooled fund is strategic
substitute with other principals’ investment in the pool). One challenge is to
find a suitable proxy for the donors’ bias, which is not directly observable. We
rely on the analysis by Knack (2013) to find a reasonable proxy.
The work of Knack (2013) is to the best of our knowledge the unique contri-
bution to the literature using detailed data to analyze the choice of channel of
delivery considering both the recipient country system characteristics and the
donor’s preferences. To be more specific Knack (2013) aims to explain donors
19For details on the sampling, see the OECD 2008 Report on Monitoring the Paris Decla-
ration.
20They can sometimes turn down some aid schemes when the costs involved are higher than
the benefit. But they are not taxing aid, whether bad or good.
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Table 1: Donor Coordination Data
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Technical assistance coordinated with 47 55.5 20 15 95
country programs (% of total aid)
How much aid uses recipient’s country 47 37 20.5 0 81
systems (% of total aid)?
How many donor missions are 47 21.5 11 5 65
coordinated (% of missions number)?
To what extent country analysis is 47 44 15.5 17 78
coordinated (% of reports)?
Source: Own calculation with data from the 2008 Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey
covering year 2007
decisions to trust (or not) recipients’ country systems. He conducts empirical
tests using data from three Paris Declaration Monitoring Surveys (PDMS), de-
signed to monitor progress toward Paris Declaration goals, covering years 2005,
2007 and 2010. He approaches the trust in country systems as a public good:
benefits to use and contribute to improve country systems are external (ben-
efit other donors) and long term, while the costs are short term and covered
by the donor using these systems. In his empirical analysis, the construction
of the variables makes the results very interesting, given the originality of the
combination of several unique datasets. His tests show that a donors use of
the recipient countrys systems is correlated positively to the donors share of aid
provided to the recipient, negatively to perceptions of corruption in the recipient
country, and positively to public support for aid in the donor country. In other
words, recipient country systems are more used by donors with a strong popular
support in favor of aid in their home country, a big share of the recipient’s aid
market, and for recipients with better institutional and trustworthy systems.
The results of Knack (2013) empirical analysis match the testable results of
our model: first less-biased donors (e.g., donors with less pressure at home to
justify how their aid was used) make more use of recipient country systems, and
second donors whose transfers are an important part of the recipient’s budget
make also more use of recipient country systems. For instance, 84.7% of 2007
Sudan’s Official Development Assistance came from bilateral donors, and from
it 60% was managed through multilateral coordination. But when looking at
the channel choice of each donor, we find that while Germany, a relatively small
donor to Sudan, pooled 20% of its budget, Netherlands, one of the top donors,
did pool 83.7% of his. Angola, on the other hand, received 66.7% of his ODA
as bilateral in 2007, and only 16% of it was coordinated. When looking at the
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detail, Japan, a top donor, poled 50% of his funds, while Switzerland, a small
donor to Angola, only pooled 0.7% of its aid.
In the present study we use the OCED-DAC-CRS dataset, accessed throught
AidData.org. We center our analysis on Sub-saharan Africa as it is the region
with the best quality data (i.e., the more comparable data across countries).
Moreover it is a pool of countries which is more homogeneous than would be a
set including recipients from other world regions. The region represents around
30% of the Development Aid flows.21
AidData.org, compiling information from several sources among which there
is the OCED-DAC-CRS dataset, provides useful information on channel of aid
delivery. From the definition of the channels used we can see an improvement on
the reporting systems: from 2006 to 2009, the main channels were NGO (local-
regional and international), Multilateral institutions and Public Sector (donor,
recipient, other). Public Sector Channel was the most used for Sub-Saharan
African recipients: 46%, 51%, 42% and 38.84% of their aid funds used this
channel for the years 2006-2009 respectively. It is impossible with such crude
categories to identify the way a donor is delivering his aid. Fortunately the
reporting improves after 2009, with the introduction of a new channel defined
as ’Donor Government’. This new category allows us to identify in the funds
managed by the Public Sector the funds managed directly by the donor and
the funds managed by the recipient. This is an important improvement in the
information available. However many problems subsist. The description of the
channel of delivery over the aggregate categories cited above is not detailed
enough. There are problems of consistency of the definitions of variables both
across donors and across time. Reporting of development aid flows by donors
is voluntary, and the homogenization of reporting rules has been a decades
long debate. Only a few of the donors, notably Austria, France, Portugal and
UK, provide detailed enough information to trace the exact management of
the funds. And the concern becomes more important when different levels of
administration at the donor country (municipalities, regional governments,...)
get involved in implementation of their funded projects. The quality of the
data should therefore be seen as poor. Measurement errors are known to lead
to inconsistent and biased estimates. Conclusions from this study need to be
qualified by this provision.
We use the dataset for the periods 2010 and 2011 when the Donor Govern-
ment channel is defined, and we use all aid projects received by Sub-Saharan
African countries from multilateral and bilateral donors. We are aware that the
time span is short due to the changes in data definition, that make these two
year the only comparable available information. And we are also aware of the
differences in reporting by the different donors, that lead to a very unbalanced
dataset. We try to control for these problems by including year and donor fixed
effects in our estimations. From the existing donor-recipient relationships in
2010, an average of 15.04 % (std: 0.15) of the funds were transferred using the
21Source: OECD-DAC. Sub-saharan Africa received 30.11% of the Development Aid flows
(ODA) in 2013, and 31% of flows in 2008
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’donor government’ channel, and for 2011 the average increased to 18.43% (std:
0.184). The significant variance on the use of this channel across donor-recipient
relationships and the important share of funds that use this channel make us
think it is worth pursuing the exercise to check the empiric relevance of the
predictions of our model.
Our goal is to study how donors’ choice to allocate funds to unilateral
projects (i.e., donor government channel) relates to the the use of the unilateral
channel by the other donors giving to the same recipient, the alternative sources
of aid received by the recipient, and the donors’ preferences towards unilateral
projects. In the model, the measurement of the share of Donor Government
Managed aid is the share of the aid budget allocated by the donor to his uni-
lateral project. This information is available in the data, and we use it, but for
completeness we also consider another measure of funds fragmentation, which
is the share of projects between a donor and a recipient that use the unilateral
channel. Both indicators, at the light of the project proliferation literature,22
are interesting and follow similar patterns. The maximum share of aid using
donor channels is 45%, while the maximum share of projects is 33%.
Knack (2013) shows that biased donors allocate more of their funds through
the unilateral channel. Donors who are less biased (e.g., Nordic countries, DAC
members, countries with popular support for aid) allocate more funds through
recipients system. Based on the available data, we therefore use as a proxy
of donor’s bias toward their own domestic interest the share of total funds
given by this donor on a given year to all his recipients using this channel.
The preferences of the donor towards the unilateral channel is captured by his
aggregate behavior. Given the short time span of the data and the changes in
the definition of channels of delivery, we are no able to use the lagged measure
of this variable, that would be an even better proxy of the donor’s bias towards
unilateral projects. We control for the behavior of other donors to the same
recipient, with the share of aid to the recipient coming from other donors. That
gives us an idea of the relative importance of the donor for the portfolio of the
recipient. Finally we use the recipient’s share of aid that is bilateral to measure
the importance of bilateral aid for the donor.
Our estimated equation has the form:
DGMdry = β1Xdry + β2Xry + β3Xdy + α1FEd + α2FEr + α3FEy + εdrt (28)
where DGMdry is the share of donor d to recipient r using donor channel of aid
delivery in year y, Xdry is a regressor that vary by donor, recipient, and year
(i.e., share of bilateral aid to recipient from other donors), Xry are regressors
that vary by recipient and year but are donor invariant (share of recipients’ aid
that is bilateral, share of recipient’s aid managed unilaterally by donors) Xdy
is a regressor that vary by donor and year but is recipient-invariant (share of
donor’s aid using unilateral channel). Finally we also include recipient (FEr),
donor (FEd) and year (FEy) fixed effects.
22See for instance Roodman 2006 (a, b)
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Table 2: Share of aid in each relationship using donor channel
Share of aid to recipient using donor channel (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of donor’s aid using unilateral channel 0.00246*** 0.00250*** 0.00185*** 0.00187***
(0.000360) (0.000367) (0.000583) (0.000588)
Share of bilateral aid to recipient from -8.58e-06 -2.86e-06 -1.84e-05 -1.81e-05
other donors (3.11e-05) (3.20e-05) (4.30e-05) (4.34e-05)
Share of recipient’s aid managed unilaterally 0.00711*** 0.00653***
by donors (0.000864) (0.00127)
Share of recipients’ aid that is bilateral 1.34e-05 -9.72e-06
(1.46e-05) (3.35e-05)
Constant 0.000671 -0.000490 0.00119 0.00170
(0.00302) (0.00337) (0.00488) (0.00575)
Donor, Recipient, and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,823 1,823
Number of donors 26 26 26 26
Number of recipients 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.060 0.025 0.073 0.059
Data source: OECD-DAC years 2010-11; Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Table 2 we present the results of the econometric exercise using share of
funds as dependent variable (columns (1) and (2) are without fixed effects and
columns (3) and (4) are with the fixed effects). The regression with the share of
projects as dependent variable is in table 3 in the appendix. These results are
consistent with those of Knack (2013) and with the model predictions. We see
that donor’s bias, measured by the share of donor’s total aid using unilateral
channel, is significantly (i.e., at the 1% level) and positively correlated with
the use of the Donor Managed channel of delivery. This result is robust to
the inclusion of recipient, donor and year fixed effects. Everything else being
equal, biased donors are channeling to any recipient a greater share of their aid
unilaterally. We also find that recipients are not all treated in the same way
by the donor community. There is indeed a strong positive correlation between
the fact that any donor use more the donor managed channel and the share of
total recipient’s aid that is managed unilaterally. This result is also consistent
with Knack (2013) findings that recipients are treated differently depending
on whether they are perceived as trustworthy or not. Knack (2013) shows
that recipient country systems are more used for recipients with lower level of
perception of corruption. We find here that donors tend to deal with recipients
in a similar fashion. Some recipients received a big share of their aid through
the donors’ managed channel, which reveals a low level of trust on the part
of the donors community, while other recipients received a lower share of their
aid in this way. Finally we also find a hint of Knack (2013) result that donors
whose transfers are an important part of the recipient’s budget make more use
of recipient country systems. Indeed the correlation between our dependent
variable and the share of aid to the recipient provided by other bilateral donors
25
is negative, even if not significant. It is consistent with larger donors relying
more on recipient managed channel. The results are robust to the introduction
of donor-recipient-year fixed effects, that control for different reporting behavior
across years and across donors.
7 Discussion
In this paper we analyzed a two donors - one recipient model where both donors
and recipients value the development project. Donors have to decide how to al-
locate their budget between a pool of funds and their unilateral project. The
former implies using the recipient’s procurement procedures and the later im-
poses special procurement rules linked to the donor project. The originality of
our approach is to study how the recipient through his choice of taxes on the
implementation of unilateral projects can affect the donors choice of channel of
delivery and through that the development returns and hence the effectiveness
of the funds transferred.
We find that, even when the donors are altruistic, their allocation of funds
may differ from the fully integrated benevolent social planner’s choice due to
an unbalanced distribution of resources between them. This result illuminates
that even if the donors are unbiased and benevolent their heterogeneity and
lack of coordination in funds yields inefficiencies. This result militates against
micro-aid schemes (i.e., cosmetic aid) and for a better coordination of donors
ahead of the transfer of funds to help the recipient to allocate the aid ressources
efficiently. The Nordic Plus group, which include Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, is a good example
of this type of donors coordination. The group is committed to improve aid
effectiveness through Joint Financing Arrangements, Joint Procurement Policy,
and Complementary Principles. The purpose is to exploit complementarities
among the members of the group, through division of labor based on compar-
ative advantages, to reduce the number of sectors and countries each donor
operates in (NORAD, 2006).23 The donors want to reduce transactions costs
for recipients and to increase aid effectiveness, even if it comes at the cost of
reduced visibility for them.
By contrast when the donors are biased, they tend to ’free ride’ on each
other’s contribution to the pool of funds. They increase their contribution to
their unilateral project in an inefficient way as it provides greater private benefits
to them than to the recipient. To correct this over investment bias the recipient
might impose taxes on the unilateral projects. Even if the taxes are lost to
the development project, they help to correct the distortions imposed by the
principals’ biased preferences. They increase aid efficiency.
The empirical evidences presented in section 6 suggest that donors are quite
heterogenous in their level of altruism. Our analysis implies that the tax rates
23http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-
ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/nordic-plus—practical-guide-to-delegated-
cooperation1.pdf
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imposed on unilateral aid should be different depending on donors’ bias and on
the productivity of his unilateral projects. This raise the question of why such
a tax scheme is not implemented. It is a simple and effective tool to correct
for negative externalities. One challenge to the design of an efficient taxation
scheme is that the tax rates have to be different from one donor to the next.
In the theory the recipient is in charge of designing the tax rate, which is fine
because the recipient objective function is to maximize the development outcome
net of the management/administrative costs. However the recipients are not all
benevolent. In practice section 6 shows that the donor community deals with the
problem of bad governance and low trustworthiness by relying on the unilateral
channel of aid delivery. They control the way their aid is spend when they fear
that it can be diverted into bribes. Allowing the recipient country to tax the
unilateral aid with arbitrary tax rates will simply provide corrupt officials with
a new tool to extract more money. A better solution would be to negotiate
these corrective taxation rates at the international level. Coordination at a
more preliminary stage of country program design, allocating task to donors
according to their comparative advantage and budgets, and allowing recipients
of aid to tax unilateral aid and micro-aid scheme, could greatly improve the
development returns of the flows of funds.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The agent chooses ck (k = 1, 2) to maximize:
Ur(B, c1, c2) = G∗(B, c1, c2)−Ψ(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)
where u∗1 and u
∗
2 are given by the planner’s allocation (8) and (9). Differentiating
Ur(B, c1, c2) with respect to ck yields:
∂Ur(B, c1, c2)
∂ck
=
αk
1 + ck
(
−G∗(B, c1, c2) + B
α(1 + ck)
Ψ′(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)
)
Since for a given ck the expression in the bracket is the same for k = 1 and
k = 2, the optimal choice for ck is necessarily symmetrical: c∗1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗.
We can thus re-write the agent optimization problem as:
max
c
Ur(B, c) = G∗(B, c)−Ψ(B − u∗c) (29)
where
u∗c = (u∗1 + u
∗
2)c =
α1 + α2
α
c
1 + c
B
and where
G∗(B, c) = Ω
Bα
(1 + c)α1+α2
with Ω = α
α1
1 α
α2
2 α
αp
p
αα .
When there is an interior solution, the first order condition, ∂Ur(B,c)∂c = 0, is
thus given by
(α1 + α2)B
α(1 + c)2
[
− αΩ B
α−1
(1 + c)α1+α2−1
+ Ψ′
(
B
α+ αpc
α(1 + c)
)]
= 0 (30)
We deduce that c∗ > 0 satisfies
Ψ′
(
B
α+ αpc
α(1 + c)
)
= αBα−1Ω(1 + c)1−α1−α2 (31)
Using the envelop theorem, at the optimum c∗ the second order condition is
∂U2r (B,c)
∂c2 =
(α1+α2)B
α(1+c)2
[
−Ψ′
(
B
α+αpc
α(1+c)
)
1−α1−α2
1+c −Ψ′′
(
B
α+αpc
α(1+c)
)
α1+α2
α(1+c)2B
]
< 0
Second order condition holds as we postulate non increasing return to scale (i.e.,
α = α1 +α2 +αp ≤ 1) and an increasing and convex cost function Ψ. Since the
right hand side of (31) is increasing in c and the left hand side is decreasing in
c, we have that c∗ > 0 whenever ∂Ur(B,c)∂c c=0 > 0. This is equivalent to
Ψ′ (B) > αΩ Bα−1
Let F (B) = ΩBα − Ψ(B). Under the assumptions α = α1 + α2 + αp ≤ 1
and Ψ′′(x) > 0 it is straightforward to check that F ′′(B) < 0. Moreover the
assumption Ψ(0) = Ψ′(0) = 0 implies that F (0) = 0 and F ′(0) > 0. We deduce
that it exists a unique B > 0 such that F ′(B) = 0. QED
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We want to show that even in the case of principals with unbiased preferences,
uncoordinated choices may lead to inefficiencies dues to the distribution of bud-
gets among the principals. When ζk = 0 principal’s k problem is:
max
uk
G(Bk +Bj , uk, uj | ck, cj)
s.t.feasibility constraint uk ∈ [0, Bk1 + ck ]
First order condition yields k, j = 1, 2 k 6= j:[
αk
uk
− (1 + ck)αp
B − uk(1 + ck)− uj(1 + cj)
]
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj) = 0 (32)
The best response functions have hence the form
u1 =
α1
αp + α1
[B1 +B2]− u2(1 + c2)
1 + c1
(33)
u2 =
α2
αp + α2
[B1 +B2]− u1(1 + c1)
1 + c2
(34)
and their intersection gives
u1 =
α1
α1 + α2 + αp
[B1 +B2]
1 + c1
u2 =
α2
α1 + α2 + αp
[B1 +B2]
1 + c2
whenever feasible. So in order to get an interior solution we need to check that
(1 + c1)u1 6 B1
B1 >
α1B2
α2 + αp
and
(1 + c2)u2 6 B2
B1 6
(α1 + αp)B2
α2
QED
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We first show that when the principals have biased preferences towards unilat-
eral projects, principal’s contributions to their unilateral projects are increasing
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with their bias. Principal’s k problem is:
max
uk
G(Bk +Bj , uk, uj | ck, cj) + ζkuk
s.t. uk ∈ [0, Bk1 + ck ]
First order condition yields[
αk
uk
− αp(1 + ck)
B − uk(1 + ck)− uj(1 + cj)
]
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj) + ζk = 0 (35)
Let p = B − uk(1 + ck)− uj(1 + cj). We deduce from (35) that
αp(1 + ck)
p
− αk
uk
=
ζk
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj) > 0 (36)
We first show that, independently of the other principal aid allocation strategy,
principal k = 1, 2 allocation to his unilateral project is increasing with ζk.
Differentiating the principal’s First Order Conditions (35) to get the sign of
duk
dζk
, yields:
duk
{[(
αk
uk
− (1+ck)αpp
)2 − αk
u2k
− (1+ck)2αpp2
]
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj)
}
+ dζk = 0
We deduce that:
duk
dζk
=
1[
αk(1−αk)
u2k
+ (1+ck)
2αp(1−αp)
p2 +
2αkαp(1+ck)
puk
]
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj)
> 0
We next show that when the principals have biased preferences towards uni-
lateral projects, principal’s contributions to their unilateral projects are strategic
substitutes. From the principal’s First Order conditions (35) we have[
αk
uk
− αp(1 + ck)
p
]
u
αj
j u
αk
k p
αp + ζk = 0→ BRk(uj) (37)
that gives principal k′s best response BRk(uj) to principal j′s allocation. Im-
plicitly deriving BRk(uj) we have dukduj =
Den
Num , where
Num =
[
αk
uk
− αp(1 + ck)
p
]2
−
[
αk
u2k
+
αp(1 + ck)2
p2
]
Num = −αk
u2k
(1− αk)− αp(1 + ck)
2
p2
(1− αp)− 2αk
uk
αp(1 + ck)
p
< 0
Den =
αp(1 + ck)(1 + cj)
p2
−
[
αk
uk
− αp(1 + ck)
p
] [
αj
uj
− αp(1 + cj)
p
]
Den =
αp(1 + ck)(1 + cj)
p2
(1− αp) + αp(1 + cj)
p
αk
uk
+
[
αp(1 + cj)
p
− αk
uk
]
αj
uj
> 0
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by virtue of (36). Hence
duk
duj
=
Den
Num
< 0
i.e. contributions to the unilateral project are strategic substitutes (best re-
sponse functions are decreasing) and contribution is increasing with principal’s
preferences towards the unilateral project.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Let ζ1 = ζ2 = ζ > 0. The principal’s first order conditions for k = 1, 2 are given
by substituting in (35) ζk = ζ:[
αk
uk
− (1 + ck)αp
B − uk(1 + ck)− uj(1 + cj)
]
G(B, uk, uj | ck, cj) + ζ = 0 (38)
Their intersection gives us
(
u∗1(c1, c2), u
∗
2(c1, c2)
)
, which must satisfy:
α1
u1
− (1 + c1)αp
B − u1(1 + c1)− u2(1 + c2) =
α2
u2
− (1 + c2)αp
B − u1(1 + c1)− u2(1 + c2) (39)
The agent’s problem becomes:
max
c1,c2
U(B, c) = u∗α11 u
∗α2
2 [B − u∗1(1 + c1)− u∗2(1 + c2)]αp −Ψ(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)
(40)
and the first order conditions are (for k, j = 1, 2)
du∗k
dck
1
u∗k
[−ζ + ckΨ′(B − u∗kck − u∗jcj)]+ du∗jdck 1u∗k [−ζ + cjΨ′(B − u∗kck − u∗jcj)]
−αp [u
∗α1
1 u
∗α2
2 [B − u∗1(1 + c1)− u∗2(1 + c2)]αp ]
B − u∗k(1 + ck)− u∗j (1 + cj)
+ Ψ′(B − u∗kck − u∗jcj) = 0
Putting together the first order conditions for both unilateral projects k, j = 1, 2
we have that
du∗1
dc1
1
u∗1
[−ζ + c1Ψ′(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)] +
du∗2
dc1
1
u∗1
[−ζ + c2Ψ′(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)]
=
du∗2
dc2
1
u∗2
[−ζ + c2Ψ′(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)] +
du∗1
dc2
1
u∗2
[−ζ + c1Ψ′(B − u∗1c1 − u∗2c2)]
(41)
First note that if α1 = α2 then c1 = c2 = c is solution to (39) and to (41) so
that in equilibrium u1 = u2.
Second we assume that c1 = c2 = c > 0 is the solution of the agent opti-
mization problem and we show that necessarily α1 = α2. For the symmetric
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Share of aid in each relationship using donor channel (1) (2) (3) (4)
Donor’s share of aid using 0.00128*** 0.00130*** 0.000500*** 0.000514***
unilateral channel (0.000352) (0.000353) (0.000551) (0.000551)
Share of aide to recipient from 2.14e-06 6.76e-06 -2.36e-05 -2.47e-05
other donors (3.04e-05) (3.07e-05) (4.06e-05) (4.07e-05)
Share of recipient’s aide that 0.00333*** 0.00130***
is managed unilateraly by donors (0.000843) (0.00120)
Share recipients’ aide that is 1.35e-05 -1.72e-05
bilateral (1.40e-05) (3.14e-05)
Constant 0.000178 -0.000105 0.00128 0.00274
(0.00295) (0.00324) (0.00460) (0.00539)
Observations 1,824 1,824 1,823 1,823
R-squared 0.016 0.008 0.091 0.090
Number donors 26 26 26 26
Number recipients 51 51 51 51
Don-Rec-Year FE No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
equilibrium c1 = c2 = c > 0 to be the optimal solution of the agent’s problem
requires from (41) that[
du∗1
dc1
+
du∗2
dc1
]
1
u∗1
=
[
du∗1
dc2
+
du∗2
dc2
]
1
u∗2
at c1 = c2 (42)
This is equivalent to:
d(u∗1+u
∗
2)
dc1
d(u∗1+u
∗
2)
dc2
=
u∗1
u∗2
at c1 = c2 (43)
Yet at c1 = c2 we have that
d(u∗1+u
∗
2)
dc1
= d(u
∗
1+u
∗
2)
dc2
so that it needs to be the case
that 1 = u
∗
1
u∗2
. Moreover from the principal’s intersection of the best response
functions (39), c1 = c2 = c > 0 implies that
u∗1
u∗2
=
α1
α2
. (44)
So for c1 = c2 = c > 0 to be the solution of the agent optimization problem it
is necessarily the case that α2 = α1.QED
Table 3: Share of projects in each relationship using donor channel
35
